Battle of the Coral Sea Part of the Pacific Theater of World War II . US Navy aircraft carrier Lexington explodes on May 8, 1942, several hours after being heavily damaged in a Japanese carrier air attack Date May 4 – May 8, 1942 Location Coral Sea, between Australia, New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands Result Japanese tactical victory; Allied strategic victory Belligerents Allied forces including:  United States  Australia Empire of Japan Commanders Frank J. Fletcher John Crace (RN/RAN) Thomas C. Kinkaid Aubrey Fitch Shigeyoshi Inoue Takeo Takagi Kiyohide Shima Sadamichi Kajioka Kuninori Marumo Aritomo Goto Chuichi Hara Strength 2 fleet carriers, 9 cruisers, 13 destroyers, 2 oilers, 1 seaplane tender 2 fleet carriers, 1 light carrier, 9 cruisers, 15 destroyers, 12 smaller warships, 1 oiler, 1 seaplane tender[1] Casualties and losses 1 fleet carrier, 1 destroyer, 1 oiler sunk, 1 fleet carrier damaged, 65 aircraft destroyed[2] 543 killed and wounded 1 light carrier, 1 destroyer, 3 smaller warships sunk, 1 fleet carrier, 1 destroyer, 2 smaller warships, 1 transport damaged, 69 aircraft destroyed[3] 1,074 killed and wounded v • d • e Pacific campaigns 1940–42 French Indochina – Nauru - Thailand – Malaya – Pearl Harbor – Hong Kong – Philippines – Guam – Wake – Dutch East Indies – New Guinea – Singapore – Australia – Indian Ocean – Doolittle Raid – Solomons – Coral Sea – Midway

v • d • e Pacific Ocean theater Pearl Harbor – Doolittle Raid – Coral Sea – Midway – Solomons – Aleutians – Gilberts & Marshalls – Marianas & Palau – Volcano Is & Ryukyu Is

v • d • e New Guinea campaign Rabaul (land battle) – Rabaul (1942 air raids) – Mo – Coral Sea – Kokoda Track – Milne Bay – Buna-Gona – Wau – Bismarck Sea – Salamaua-Lae – Cartwheel – Wewak raid – Finisterres – Huon Peninsula – Bougainville – Rabaul (1943 air raids) – New Britain – Admiralties – Western New Guinea

v • d • e Battle for Australia Air raids – Darwin – Broome – Coral Sea – Naval attacks – Sydney & Newcastle – Kokoda – Milne Bay

The Battle of the Coral Sea, fought between May 4 – May 8, 1942, with most of the action occurring on May 7 and May 8, was a major naval battle in the Pacific Theater of World War II between the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Allied forces of the United States Navy and the Australian Navy. It was the first fleet action in which aircraft carriers engaged each other. It was also the first naval battle in history in which neither side's ships sighted or fired directly upon the other.

It is considered a tactical victory for Japan, since the United States lost fleet carrier USS Lexington in exchange for the light carrier Shoho. At the same time, the battle was a strategic victory for the Allies because the Japanese abandoned their attempt to land troops to take Port Moresby, New Guinea. The engagement ended with no clear victor, but the damage suffered and experience gained by both sides set the stage for the Battle of Midway.^[4]

Background

On December 7, 1941, using aircraft carriers, the Japanese attacked the US Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The attack crippled most of the US Pacific Fleet's battleships and started a formal state of war between the two nations. In launching this war, Japanese leaders sought to neutralize the US fleet, seize possessions rich in natural resources, and obtain strategic military bases to defend their far-flung empire. Soon after, other nations, including the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand joined the U.S. as Allies in the war against Japan. In the words of the Japanese Navy's Combined Fleet Secret Order Number One, dated November 1, 1941, the goals of the initial Japanese campaigns in the impending war were to, "(eject) British and American strength from the Netherlands Indies and the Philippines, (and) to establish a policy of autonomous self-sufficiency and economic independence."^[5] The plan was to set up a defensive perimeter around Japan so its production facilities will not be attacked during the possibility upcoming total war. More importantly Japan hoped to protect its shipping routes so the much needed raw materials and oil can be shipped without interruption. To support these goals, during the first few months of 1942 Japanese forces also attacked and took control of the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, Wake Island, New Britain, and Guam.^[6]

Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue, commander of the Japanese 4th Fleet (also called the South Seas Force) consisting of most of the naval units in the South Pacific area, advocated the seizing of Lae, Salamaua, and Port Moresby in New Guinea and Tulagi in the Solomon Islands. Inoue believed that the capture and control of these locations would provide greater security for the major Japanese base at Rabaul on New Britain. Japan's Naval General Staff endorsed Inoue's argument and began planning further operations, using these locations as supporting bases, to seize Nauru, Ocean Island, New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa and thereby cut the supply lines between Australia and the United States, with the goal of reducing or eliminating Australia as a threat to Japanese positions in the South Pacific.^[7]

The Japanese Imperial Army supported the idea of taking Port Moresby and in April 1942, with the Japanese Navy, developed a plan for the attack that was titled Operation Mo. The plan also included the seizure of Tulagi, a small island in the southern Solomon Islands, where a seaplane base would be set up for potential air operations against Allied territories and forces in the South Pacific. Although Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander of the Combined Fleet, was concurrently planning an operation that he hoped would lure the U.S. Navy's Pacific fleet into a decisive showdown in the central Pacific, he detached some of his large warships to support the Mo operation and placed Inoue in charge of the naval portion of the operation.^[8]

Forces involved

For more details on this topic, see Coral Sea order of battle.

A large force consisting of one light and two fleet aircraft carriers, a seaplane carrier, nine cruisers, and 13 destroyers, split into several elements, was to guard the Japanese Port Moresby invasion convoy as well as to engage any Allied warships that approached to contest the invasion.^[9]

Allied intelligence personnel had deciphered much of the Japanese Mo plans through radio intercepts at the Allied Fleet Radio Unit in Melbourne, Australia and Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.^[10] Based on this intelligence, on April 22, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) Admiral Chester Nimitz, headquartered at Pearl Harbor, directed Allied forces towards the Coral Sea area to interdict Operation Mo. On April 27, the aircraft carrier USS Yorktown's task force, under the command of Vice Admiral Frank Fletcher, sortied from Tonga and was joined by the carrier USS Lexington's task force near the New Hebrides on May 1. The two task forces, operating semi-independently of each other, prepared to engage any Japanese forces operating in the Coral Sea area.^[11]

Prelude to battle

Three Japanese task forces set sail. Two invasion forces headed for the Solomons and Port Moresby, accompanied by a covering force. This force consisted of of two large, modern aircraft carriers, Shokaku and Zuikaku (both veterans of the attack on Pearl Harbor), a smaller carrier, Shoho, two heavy cruisers, and supporting craft.

Alerted by radio intercepts, the Allies knew Japanese land-based aircraft were being moved south and that an operation was impending. Three main groups opposed the Japanese: Yorktown, which was already in the Coral Sea, Lexington, which was en route (both of which would come under the overall command of Admiral Frank Fletcher) and a joint Allied surface force, Task Force 44, under Australian Rear Admiral John Crace, made up of the cruisers HMAS Australia, HMAS Hobart, and USS Chicago, and destroyers USS Perkins, USS Walke, and USS Farragut. United States carriers Hornet and Enterprise were heading south after the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo, but arrived too late to take part in the battle.

Battle

Map of the battle

Tulagi

For more details on this topic, see Invasion of Tulagi (May 1942).

Lexington joined Yorktown on May 1. The Japanese occupied Tulagi without incident on May 3, and began construction of a seaplane base. After fueling, Yorktown closed on Tulagi and on May 4 launched three successful strikes against Japanese ships and aircraft there, revealing her presence, yet sinking the destroyer Kikuzuki and five merchantmen, crippling the island's seaplane reconnaissance capability, and damaging other vessels. Yorktown then retired south to rendezvous with the Lexington and the newly-arrived cruisers.

May 6

Land-based B-17s attacked the approaching Port Moresby invasion fleet on May 6 with the usual lack of success. Almost another year would pass before the USAAF realized high-altitude bombing attacks against moving naval targets were pointless. Although both carrier groups flew extensive searches on May 6, cloudy weather kept them hidden from each other, and the two sides spent the night only 110 kilometres (70 mi) apart. Other Allied aircraft joined the battle, from airbases at Cooktown and Mareeba on Cape York Peninsula, Australia.

Shoho torpedoed by U.S. carrier aircraft late in the morning of 7 May.

That night, Fletcher, whose role was to protect Port Moresby, made the difficult decision to detach Crace to block the probable course of an invasion. Fletcher and Crace knew exposing surface ships to attack by land-based aircraft without air cover risked a repeat of the loss of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse five months before. Their fears were nearly realized when the cruisers were spotted and came under an intense air attack from a squadron of torpedo bombers on the afternoon of May 7. The ships escaped with few casualties and little damage. Only minutes after the Japanese raid Crace's force was inadvertently attacked by friendly B-17s. Farragut and Perkins once again had to endure near misses.

Shokaku under attack by aircraft from Yorktown during the morning of 8 May. Flames are visible from a bomb hit on her forecastle.

May 7

On May 7, both fleets launched all available aircraft, but neither found the main body of the other, mistakenly attacking subsidiary enemy forces instead. Japanese aircraft found and attacked the U.S. fleet oiler Neosho and her escorting destroyer Sims, mistaking them for a carrier and a cruiser. Two waves of torpedo and dive bombers swarmed over both ships resulting in Sims being sunk and Neosho crippled.

Meanwhile, U.S. aircraft, sent in the wrong direction by a miscoded contact report, had missed Shokaku and Zuikaku but found the invasion fleet, escorted by the small carrier Shoho, which was soon sunk with heavy casualties. In the previous five months, the Allies had lost numerous major warships and had been unable to sink a single major Japanese combatant in return. Shoho was small by carrier standards, but the laconic phrase “scratch one flattop,” radioed back to Lexington by then-Lieutenant Commander Robert E. Dixon,^[12] announced the first Allied naval success of the Pacific War. Dixon's phrase was quoted by Chicago Tribune war correspondent Stanley Johnston in a June 1942 article and subsequently requoted in most accounts of the Pacific War.^[13] Lexington's commanding officer, Captain Frederick C. Sherman, USN, credited Dixon with coining the word "flattop" which became standard slang for an aircraft carrier.^[13]

May 8

Finally, with dawn searches on May 8, the main carrier forces located one another and launched maximum effort raids, which passed each other in the air. Hidden by rain, Zuikaku escaped detection, but Shokaku was hit three times by bombs. Her deck damaged, Shokaku was unable to land her aircraft and effectively put out of action.

Lexington afire and sinking after her crew abandoned ship, 8 May. Note planes parked aft, where fires have not yet reached.

Lexingtons CXAM-1 radar detected the inbound Japanese aircraft at a range of 68 mi (126 km),^[14] but the Americans underestimated the performance of the Nakajima B5N and positioned their fighters too low to intercept.^[15] Both American carriers were hit: Yorktown by a bomb; the larger, less maneuverable Lexington by both bombs and torpedoes. Although the latter survived the immediate damage and was thought to be repairable, leaking aviation fuel exploded a little over an hour later. Lexington had to be abandoned and scuttled to prevent her capture.

Crace continued to stand between the invasion force and Port Moresby. Inoue was misled by returning fliers’ reports as to the strength of the Allied cruiser and destroyer force, and he recalled the invasion fleet. With Shokaku damaged and Zuikaku short of aircraft, neither was able to take part in the crucial Battle of Midway a month later. The damaged Yorktown returned to Pearl Harbor for repairs.

Aftermath

6 May:
—I Refueling group, Sims and Neosho —II Task force Fox, Lexington and Yorktown
—I Invasion group, Shoho —II Shokaku and Zuikaku
7 May:
—III Cruiser group --- American carrier based bombers
--- Japanese carrier based bombers
--- Allied land based bombers
--- Japanese land based bombers
1. Sims sunk, Neosho damaged.
2. Shoho sunk by carrier aircraft.
3. Cruiser force attacked, no damage.
8 May:
4.Lexington and Yorktown damaged.
5. Shokaku damaged.
6. Lexington sunk.
7. Neosho scuttled 11 May by Henley

Tactical

Despite heavier personnel casualties due to the quick sinking of Shoho, the Japanese had achieved a narrow tactical victory. One small carrier was lost and a large carrier severely damaged against the Americans’ loss of a large carrier and significant damage to another.

Strategic

In strategic terms, the Allies had won because the seaborne invasion of Port Moresby was averted. Port Moresby was vital to Allied strategy and could not have been defended by the ground forces stationed there. This was the first time that a Japanese invasion force had been turned back without achieving its objective. In addition, it was a moral victory. From the Allied point of view, after five months of continuous defeat, a battle that came out almost even was a victory.

The battle had a substantial effect on the morale and the strategic planning of both sides. Without a hold in New Guinea the subsequent Allied advance, difficult though it was, would have been much harder still. Because their seaborne invasion had failed, the Japanese chose instead to attack Moresby overland. The consequent delay was just long enough to permit the arrival of the veteran Second Australian Imperial Force to fight the Kokoda Track campaign and the Battle of Milne Bay, which in turn relieved pressure on U.S. forces at Guadalcanal.

Carriers

Although Zuikaku was only slightly damaged, with only 40 aircraft left she was in no condition to fight and had to return to Japan to replenish her air wings. Shokaku was severely damaged, unable to operate aircraft, and took six months to repair. Despite the likely availability of sufficient aircraft between the two ships to re-equip Zuikaku with a composite air group, the Japanese made no serious attempt to get her ready for Midway.^[16]

The loss of Lexington was a severe blow, as she was one of the Navy's largest carriers. Yorktown was still able to operate aircraft. Though her damage was estimated to require 90 days of repairs when she arrived at Pearl Harbor on May 27, the Navy Yard worked around the clock and she sailed for Midway on the morning of May 30.^[17] Even as she sailed, repair crews remained aboard Yorktown', working to make her more or less battle-worthy.^[18]

Responses

The U.S. Navy learned a great deal from the Battle of the Coral Sea. Following the loss of Lexington, better ways to contain aviation fuel and control defensive fighter aircraft were developed. After the costly attacks on the Japanese carriers, it was clear that coordination of dive- and torpedo bombers had to be improved. Most importantly of all, the battle provided a significant morale boost because it showed that the Japanese could be beaten.

Admiral Fletcher continued to command carrier forces and served as the senior USN officer at Midway. Admiral Takagi was relegated to less important assignments in the aftermath of Coral Sea.

See also

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Battle of the Coral Sea

• Axis naval activity in Australian waters
• Planned invasion of Australia during World War II
• Christmas Island Invasion
• USS Coral Sea
• American Deboyne strike

Notes

References

[] Printed sources

• Brown, David (1990). Warship Losses of World War Two, Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-914-X. 
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• D'Albas, Andrieu (1965). Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II, Devin-Adair Pub. ISBN 0-8159-5302-X. 
• Dull, Paul S. (1978). A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941-1945, Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-097-1. 
• Frank, Richard (1990). Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle. New York: Random House. ISBN 0-394-58875-4. 
• Hata, Ikuhiko; Yasuho Izawa, Don Cyril Gorham (translator) (1975 (original) 1989 (translation)). Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Units in World War II. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-315-6. 
• Hayashi, Saburo (1959). Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War, Marine Corps Association. ASIN B000ID3YRK. 
• Henry, Chris (2003). The Battle of the Coral Sea. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-033-1. 
• Holmes, W. J. (1979). Double-edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific During World War II. Annapolis, Maryland: Blue Jacket Books/Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-324-9. 
• Hoyt, Edwin P. (2003). Blue Skies and Blood: The Battle of the Coral Sea, I Books. ISBN 0-7434-5835-4. 
• Ito, Masanori (1956 (original) 1962 (translation)). The End of the Imperial Japanese Navy, Jove Books. ISBN 0-515-08682-7. 
• Jersey, Stanley Coleman (2008). Hell's Islands: The Untold Story of Guadalcanal. College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press. ISBN 1-58544-616-5. 
• Lundstrom, John B. (2005 (New edition)). First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign: Naval Fighter Combat from August to November 1942, Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-472-8. 
• Lundstrom, John B. (2005 (New edition)). The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway. Annapolis, Maryland, U.S.A.: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 159114471X. 
• Mason, Robert (June 1982). Eyewitness, United States Naval Institute Proceedings. 
• Millot, Bernard; S.V. Whitley (Translator) (1974)). The Battle of the Coral Sea. Great Britain: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-909-x. 
• Morison, Samuel Eliot (1949 (reissue 2001)). Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions, May 1942-August 1942, vol. 4 of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Champaign, Illinois, USA: University of Illinois Press. ISBN 0-252-06995-1. 
• Parkin, Robert Sinclair (1995). Blood on the Sea: American Destroyers Lost in World War II, Da Capo Press. ISBN 0-306-81069-7. 
• Parshall, Jonathan; Tully, Anthony (2005). Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books. ISBN 1-57488-923-0. 
• Peattie, Mark R. (1999). Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power 1909-1941. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-664-X. 
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• Toland, John (2003 (1970)). The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945. New York: The Modern Library. ISBN 0-8129-6858-1. 
• Willmott, H. P. (1982). Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-535-3. 
• Willmott, H. P. (2002). The War with Japan: The Period of Balance, May 1942 – October 1943. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc.. ISBN 0-8420-5032-9. 

Web

• Australian War Memorial. "Battle of the Coral Sea". Encyclopedia. Retrieved on November 20, 2006.
• Bullard, Steven (translator) (2007). Japanese army operations in the South Pacific Area New Britain and Papua campaigns, 1942–43. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. ISBN 9780975190487, http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/ajrp2.nsf/088031725e4569e4ca256f4f00126373/1fcb61d633972daaca257291000abf44?OpenDocument. 
• Gill, G. Hermon (1968). Volume II – Royal Australian Navy, 1942–1945. Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/chapter.asp?volume=25. Retrieved on 20 November 2006. 
• McCarthy, Dudley (1959). Volume V – South–West Pacific Area – First Year: Kokoda to Wau. Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Canberra: Australian War Memorial, http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/chapter.asp?volume=21. Retrieved on 2 November 2006. 
• Office of Naval Intelligence (1943). "The Battle of the Coral Sea". Combat Narrative. Publications Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence, United States Navy. Retrieved on 2006-11-20.
• Parker, Frederick D.. "Part One: The Battle of the Coral Sea". A Priceless Advantage: U.S. Navy Communications Intelligence and the Battles of Coral Sea, Midway, and the Aleutians. National Security Agency, Central Security Service. Retrieved on November 20, 2006.
• United States Army Center of Military History. "The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Volume I". Reports of General MacArthur. Retrieved on 2006-12-08.
• United States Army Center of Military History. "Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, Volume II - Part I". Reports of General MacArthur. Retrieved on 2006-12-08.
• United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) - Naval Analysis Division (1946). "Chapter 4: The Battle of the Coral Sea". The Campaigns of the Pacific War. United States Government Printing Office. Retrieved on 2006-11-20.

Further information

• Brett, J. H., Jr. (May 10, 1942). "Task Force 11 Report". United States Navy. Retrieved on 2008-11-06. (Primary source)
• Cagney, James (2005). "The Battle of The Coral Sea, May 3-8, 1942". Pacific War Animated. Retrieved on 2008-11-06.
• Generous, William Thomas, Jr., (2003). Sweet Pea at War: A History of USS Portland (CA-33), University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 0-8131-2286-4. 
• Greene, Jack (1995). The Midway Campaign. Pennsylvania: Combined Books. ISBN 0-938289-11-X. 
• Nelson, Hank. "Report on Historical Sources on Australia and Japan at war in Papua and New Guinea, 1942-45". Retrieved on 2006-12-13.
• Nowack, H. F. (May 15, 1942). "USS Lexington (CV2)". United States Navy. Retrieved on 2008-11-06. (Primary source)
• Sinclair, Don (1997). Cooktown at War: A Record of Activities in Cooktown During World War II, Cooktown and District Historical Society. 
• Smith, Douglas V. (2006). Carrier Battles: Command Decision in Harm's Way, US Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1591147948. 
• United States Naval Historical Center (2000). "Battle of the Coral Sea, 7-8 May 1942". Online Library of Selected Images: EVENTS -- World War II in the Pacific. Retrieved on November 20, 2006.
• United States Navy (May 8, 1942). "Preliminary Report, U.S.S. Lexington, Loss in Action". United States Navy. Retrieved on 2008-11-06. (Primary source)